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The Court of International Trade's Political Party
Diversity Requirement: Unconstitutional under
Any Separation of Powers Theory
Adam J. Rappaportt
The power to appoint federal judges is one of the few compo-
nents of the Constitution to involve all three branches of the govern-
ment. The framers considered this power so crucial and potentially
dangerous that they explicitly divided it between the President and
Congress. The partisan interests of the President, reflected in his cho-
sen nominees, were pitted against the corresponding interests of the
Senate, reflected in its unrestrained power to accept or reject those
nominees.'
Any effort to circumvent this precise separation of powers there-
fore should be met with skepticism. And any attempt to alter the bal-
ancing of partisan interests is even more dubious. Nevertheless, one
unique federal law does exactly this. Beyond residency requirements,
the President has unbounded discretion to choose his nominees for
the federal bench. But the President is significantly restrained in his
selection of nominees to the Court of International Trade ("CIT"). By
statute, no more than five of the nine members of the CIT may be
from any one political party.
This Comment considers whether this requirement for political
party diversity on the CIT violates the Appointments Clause of Arti-
cle II of the Constitution Part I describes the CIT and the evolution
of its unique political party diversity requirement. Part II examines
formalist and functionalist theories of the separation of powers, other
restrictions on the President's power to nominate federal officers, and
the scant judicial treatment of such restrictions. Parts III and IV ex-
plore in detail the CIT's political party diversity requirement using
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1 See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (Appointments Clause).
2 See Court of International Trade Act, Pub L No 106-580,62 Stat 899 (1948), codified at
28 USC § 251(a) (1994).
3 This restriction, along with political party diversity requirements imposed on administra-
tive agencies, may also violate First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. This theory
is beyond the scope of this Comment, but is explored briefly in Jamin B. Raskin, "A Complicated
and Indirect Encroachment": Is the Federal Election Commission Unconstitutionally Composed?,
52 Admin L Rev 609,623-26 (2000) (arguing that bipartisanship requirements for appointments
to the FEC do not survive First Amendment scrutiny).
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formalist and functionalist perspectives on the Appointments Clause,
respectively. The Comment concludes that this restriction violates the
Appointments Clause under either theory, and argues that functional-
ism offers a marginally better means of addressing statutory restric-
tions in general.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CIT AND THE POLITICAL
DIVERSITY REQUIREMENT
The CIT is a specialized federal trial court established under Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution.' It has subject matter jurisdiction over
civil suits that arise out of agency actions on import transactions; its
geographical jurisdiction extends throughout the United States;6 and it
ordinarily sits in New York. The CIT possesses all of the legal and eq-
uitable powers of a United States District Court. The court consists of
nine judges who must be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Senate Most cases are assigned to a single CIT judge."° The
chief judge establishes a three judge panel for cases that involve the
constitutionality of an act of Congress, a presidential proclamation, or
an executive order, or for those that have broad and significant impli-
cations in the administration or interpretation of the customs laws."
CIT decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, and from there to the Supreme Court."
The organic statute establishing the CIT contains a unique provi-
sion. It mandates that "[n]ot more than five of such judges shall be
from the same political party."" While similar political party diversity
requirements are not uncommon for administrative bodies," the CIT
4 See 28 USC § 251(a) (authorizing the CIT under Article III and establishing its compo-
sition).
5 See Gregory W. Carman, The Jurisdiction of the United States Court of International
Trade: A Dilemma for Potential Litigants, 22 Stetson L Rev 157, 160-62 (1992) (describing the
composition and jurisdiction of the CIT). See also Matt Valitchka, Comment, Customs Courts
Act of 1980: An Evaluation and Analysis, 4 Hamline L Rev 538-39 (1981) (describing jurisdiction
of the United States Customs Court, the immediate predecessor of the CIT); Paul P. Rao, Com-
ment, A Primer on Customs Court Practice, 40 Brooklyn L Rev 581, 584-87 (1974) (describing
jurisdiction and practice of the Board of General Appraisers and the U.S. Customs Court,
predecessors of the CIT).
6 See Carman, 22 Stetson L Rev at 160 (cited in note 5) (noting that the CIT is a national
trial court).
7 28 USC § 251(c).
8 See Carman, 22 Stetson L Rev at 161 (cited in note 5).
9 28 USC § 251(a).
10 28 USC § 254 (1994).
11 28 USC § 255 (1994).
12 See 28 USC § 1295(a)(5) (1994) (governing appeals from final decisions of the CIT); 28
USC § 1292(d)(1) (1994) (governing appeals of interlocutory orders of the CIT).
13 28USC§251(a).
14 See note 88.
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is the only Article III court with such a restriction." This Section
examines the history and jurisdiction of the CIT in general and the
evolution of its political party restriction.
A. History of the CIT
The original predecessor of the modern Court of International
Trade came into existence in 1890 as the Board of General Appraisers,
a quasi-judicial administrative body within the Treasury Department. M
Congress created the Board in response to inconsistent assessments of
import duties at various United States ports and to the increase in liti-
gation over customs decisions that clogged state and federal courts."
Granted original jurisdiction over all cases concerning the application
of tariff laws,18 the Board reviewed decisions by customs officials on
the classification and valuation of imported goods.'9
Congress replaced the Board in 1926 with the United States Cus-
toms Court, which it established under Article I of the Constitution.'
The change was in name only, as essentially no changes were made in
the tribunal's functions, duties, or jurisdiction." Over the next thirty
years, Congress gradually integrated the Customs Court into the fed-
eral court system.23 Congress completed this process in 1956 by desig-
nating it a court under Article 111.24
15 See Customs Courts Act of 1980, S 1654,96th Cong, 2d Sess, in 126 Cong Rec S 27063-64
(Sept 24, 1980) (statement of Senator DeConcini) (noting CIT's party restrictions as unique
among Article III courts).
16 Act of June 10, 1890,26 Stat 131, 136.
17 Rao, Comment, 40 Brooklyn L Rev at 585 (cited in note 5) (describing creation of the
Board of General Appraisers as an attempt to overcome problems of expanding trade in a rap-
idly growing nation).
18 Id.
19 See Customs Courts Act of 1980, HR 7540, 96th Cong, 2d Sess, in 126 Cong Rec H
26553-54 (Sept 22, 1980) (statement of Representative Rodino) ("Because customs duties were
the principal source of revenue for the Government, the tariff statutes and the corresponding
administrative procedures were designed to maximize the Government's ability to collect such
duties with a minimal emphasis on judicial review.").
20 Act of May 28, 1926, Pub L No 69-304,44 Stat 669.
2t See 126 Cong Rec H at 26553 (cited in note 19) (statement of Representative Rodino)
(describing new Customs Court as an Article I court). The Supreme Court later confirmed the
Article I status of both the Board and the court. See Ex Parte Bakelite Corp, 279 US 438,457-58
(1929) ("[I]ts functions, although mostly quasijudicial, were all susceptible of performance by ex-
ecutive officers."). See also Carman, 22 Stetson L Rev at 158 (cited in note 5) (same).
22 See Rao, Comment, 40 Brooklyn L Rev at 586 (cited in note 5). See also 126 Cong Rec
H at 26553 (cited in note 19) (statement of Representative Rodino) ("In fact, the court contin-
ued to function in most matters as would have its predecessor in reviewing the actions of the Bu-
reau of Customs.").
23 See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub L No 71-361,46 Stat 590,738 (transferring maintenance and
operation of court from Secretary of the Treasury to Attorney General); Act of Aug 7, 1939, Pub
L No 76-299, 53 Stat 1223, 1225 (bringing court within the supervision of the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts); Act of June 25, 1948, Pub L No 80-773, 62 Stat 869, 943
(integrating the court into the structure, organization, and procedures of the United States court
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Despite the adjustments, problems with the role and jurisdiction
of the court developed in the 1960s. Worldwide decreases in tariff
rates diminished the importance of the court's classification and
valuation duties, and the patchwork of laws governing emerging trade
issues increasingly led parties to contest government decisions in fed-
eral district courts." Congress first addressed these issues in the Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1970 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979."
Congress made more fundamental changes to the court's jurisdiction
and procedure in the Customs Courts Act of 1980.27 At present, the
court
system).
24 Act of July 14, 1956, Pub L No 84-703, 70 Stat 532. Congress specified that the act did
not change the court's jurisdiction. Id. Courts established by Congress under Article III are lim-
ited by the jurisdictional provisions of Article III, and judges of these courts are guaranteed life-
time tenure and salary protection. Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitu-
tional Law § 2.1 at 75 (West 1999). Congress has also established Article I courts, called legisla-
tive courts. These courts are not constrained by Article III's jurisdictional provisions, and judges
of these courts do not receive the Article III protections. Id at 75-76. "These Article I tribunals
are really akin to administrative agencies." Id at 76. Article I courts generally fall into three cate-
gories: courts established to adjudicate public rights, such as the United States Tax Court and
federal bankruptcy courts; territorial courts; and military tribunals. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Courts, and Article III, 101 Harv L Rev 916, 921-22, 971-74
(1988). Like administrative agencies, some Article I courts have appointment restrictions. See
note 82.
25 Limited by its organic statutes, the court had "not kept pace with the increasing com-
plexities of modem day international trade litigation." Customs Courts Act of 1980, HR Rep No
96-1235, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 18-19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 USCCAN 3729, 3730-31. Designed
to review classification and valuation determinations, the court's jurisdiction had remained es-
sentially unchanged since its origin as the Board of General Appraisers, a period in which tariff
rates were the central factor in international trade. As a result, the court had limited remedy op-
tions: in most cases, it could only agree or disagree with an administrative decision, and it could
not issue money judgments or provide equitable relief. As tariff rates declined, cases involving
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes gained greater importance. Unsure whether the
Customs Court had jurisdiction over these cases, and concerned about the limited powers of the
court, litigants increasingly filed challenges in federal district court. This led to inconsistent deci-
sions and high uncertainty among litigants. Id. See also 126 Cong Rec at S 27063 (statement of
Senator DeConcini) (cited in note 15) (describing problems with the Customs Court's jurisdic-
tion and procedures); Richard A. Cohen, The New United States Court of International Trade, 20
Colum J Transnatl L 277,278-82 (1981) (same); Valitchka, Comment, 4 Hamline L Rev at 540-44
(cited in note 5) (same).
26 Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-271, 84 Stat 274,275-76 (making adjustments
to the court's procedures); Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub L No 96-39, 93 Stat 144, 150-89
(giving the court limited authority to grant equitable remedies and creating new causes of action
within the court's jurisdiction on antidumping and countervailing duty questions). See also
Cohen, 20 Colum J Transnatl L at 281-82 (cited in note 25) (summarizing changes in Trade
Agreements Act of 1979).
27 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-417,94 Stat 1727, codified in various sections
of title 28 (1994) (expanding and clarifying the court's subject matter jurisdiction, altering its
procedures, and granting it equitable powers of money and injunctive relief). See also Cohen, 20
Colum J Transnatl L at 282-92 (cited in note 25) (explaining reforms in 1980 act).
1432 [68:1429
CIT's Political Party Diversity Requirement
has authority over the classification and valuation of merchan-
dise, the charging of duties and fees on the importation of mer-
chandise, the exclusion of merchandise from entry under provi-
sions of the customs laws, the liquidation of entries, the refusal to
pay drawback, and challenges to antidumping and countervailing
duty decisions.8
The court also "has jurisdiction to review the denial, revocation,
or suspension of a customs broker's license, determinations of eligibil-
ity for trade adjustments under the Trade Act of 1974, and penalty
cases." 9 The Customs Courts Act of 1980 clarified that the CIT has the
same powers in law and equity as any other Article III court.nO The Act
also again renamed the court, this time as the United States Court of
International Trade.
B. Evolution of the CIT's Political Party Diversity Requirement
The original 1890 statute creating the Board of General Apprais-
ers instructed the President to appoint nine general appraisers of mer-
chandise, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.32 It further
stipulated that "[n]ot more than five of such general appraisers shall
be appointed from the same political party."3 As the status and juris-
diction of the court evolved through 1980, the political party diversity
requirement remained intact and apparently unquestioned. 1
Congress debated the wisdom and legitimacy of the political
party diversity requirement during the drafting and passage of the
1980 Act, but in the end it retained the provision. The first version of
the bill eliminated the restriction, and passed the Senate with little
28 Carman, 22 Stetson L Rev at 161 (cited in note 5) (citations omitted).
29 Id (citations omitted).
30 HR Rep No 96-1235 at 20 (cited in note 25).
31 Customs Courts Act of 1980 § 101, 94 Stat at 1727.
32 Act of June 10, 1890, 26 Stat at 136.
33 Id. A handful of other administrative boards and commissions established prior to the
Board of General Appraisers included a similar political party restriction. The first political party
diversity requirement appears to have been imposed on the board of elections for the Utah Ter-
ritory Act of Mar 22, 1882,22 Stat 30,32 (explaining that the president should appoint five board
members, "not more than three of whom shall be members of one political party"). See Myers v
United States, 272 US 52, 270 n 51 (1926) (Brandeis dissenting) (listing agencies with political
party restrictions). The diversity requirement was soon extended to the Civil Service Commis-
sion, Act of Jan 16, 1883, 22 Stat 403 (requiring that only two of three commissioners come from
the same political party), the Interstate Commerce Commission, Act of Feb 4, 1887, 24 Stat 379,
383 (permitting only three of five commissioners to share the same political party), and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, Act of Sept 26, 1914,38 Stat 717,717-18 (same).
34 However, the title of the restricted individuals changed first from "general appraisers" to
"justices," Act of May 28, 1926,44 Stat at 669, then from "justices" to "judges." Tariff Act of 1930,
46 Stat at 737.
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controversy." The sponsor, Senator Dennis DeConcini, later explained
the policy rationales for deleting the requirement. First, he noted that
the provision is a vestige of the court's original Article I status and ar-
gued that judges of an Article III court should be appointed on merit
alone." Second, DeConcini argued that the restriction would tend to
politicize the court."
Following the Senate's lead, the original House bill also elimi-
nated the requirement." During a House Judiciary subcommittee
hearing on the bill, however, Representative Robert McClory de-
fended the provision as an effective way to keep the membership of
the court politically balanced." After some additional legislative ma-
neuvering, the House and Senate passed a final version of the bill that
included the political diversity requirement."
Congress subtly changed the political diversity language during
this process. It deleted "appointed" from the provision, leaving it as:
"Not more than five of such judges shall be from the same political
party."1 There is no record of why Congress altered the language, but
the modification does not change the statute's effect. The restriction
limits the prior sentence, which instructs the President to appoint nine
judges to the CIT by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.2
Congress has not subsequently altered the provision.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON FEDERAL OFFICERS AND THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The political diversity requirement of the CIT is one of many
statutory restrictions on appointment to federal office. By limiting the
President's power under the Appointments Clause of Article II, these
restrictions may pose separation of powers problems. Two main theo-
35 Customs Courts Act of 1979, S 1654, 96th Cong, 1st Sess, in 125 Cong Rec S 36624,
36625-31 (Dec 18, 1979).
36 126 Cong Rec at S 27064 (cited in note 15).
37 Id. Nevertheless, Senator DeConcini said he thought the provision was constitutional.
Customs Courts Act of 1980, Hearings on HR 6394 before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 5 (1980) (responding
"no" when asked whether it was his position that the existing law was unconstitutional).
38 HR Rep No 96-1235 at 30 (cited in note 25).
39 Hearings on HR 6394, 96th Cong, 2d Sess at 13 (cited in note 37). Representative
McClory, a Republican, argued that 90 percent of the federal judges nominated by President
Carter were Democrats, while President Ford "had a balance of 60/40 or so." Id. The requirement
would "ameliorate partisan considerations by requiring a President on occasion to look outside
his party for qualified candidates." HR Rep No 96-1235 at 134 (cited in note 25) (additional
views of Representatives Robert McClory, Tom Railsback, Henry J. Hyde, and James Sensen-
brenner, Jr.).
40 See 126 Cong Rec H 26555 (Sept 22, 1980) (House passage of bill with requirement); 126
Cong Rec S 27064 (Sept 24,1980) (Senate concurrence in House bill).
41 28 USC § 251(a).
42 Id.
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ries are used to interpret constitutional provisions that implicate the
separation of powers: formalism and functionalism. These theories are
reflected in the few opinions that address the constitutional status of
statutory restrictions on appointment. This Part examines these theo-
ries and their application, and concludes that the analysis in the cases
is not sufficient to determine if the CIT's political party restriction
violates the Appointments Clause.
A. Formalist and Functionalist Perspectives of the
Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause of Article II establishes the method for
selecting federal government officers. The clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.3
The Clause does not explicitly address restrictions on and qualifi-
cations for federal offices, leaving it open to a variety of interpreta-
tions. The Clause arose out of the framers' desire to divide the power
to appoint federal officers-a power they believed essential to the ef-
ficient operation of government-between the executive and legisla-
tive branches.'
Separation of powers issues are usually interpreted using two dis-
tinct theories." Formalism sees the text of the Constitution as clearly
dividing the three branches of government, with overlapping power
only in the few areas where the text expressly authorizes it.4 This view
43 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2. Federal judges who serve on Article III courts such as the CIT
clearly qualify as principal or superior officers who must be nominated by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate. See Edmond v United States, 520 US 651, 667 (1997) (Souter concurring)
("United States district judges cannot be inferior officers, since the power of appellate review
does not extend to them personally, but is limited to their judgments.").
44 See Federalist 76 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 456-58 (New
American Library 1961) (discussing the advantages of dividing the power to nominate and ap-
point between the President and the Senate).
45 Consider Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L Rev 488,489 (1987) (noting the Court's vacil-
lation between formalism and functionalism). For a good list of formalist and functionalist
commentary, see M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va L
Rev 1127, 1137 n 35 (2000). For a classification of Supreme Court cases, see id at 1138 n 37.
46 See Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L J 449,455 n 24 (1991) (observ-
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is rooted in the Constitution's separation of powers into the first three
distinct articles, and in the vesting clauses that assign certain powers to
each branch. This textual and structural separation allows each
branch to act as a check on the power of the others, but only through
the avenues authorized by the Constitution.8 Any apportionment of
power outside of these avenues, therefore, violates the Constitution.
Because it is based on the distribution of power that the framers es-
tablished, formalism for the most part interprets constitutional ambi-
guities only through tools that reflect that original distribution.4 9 For-
malism thus focuses primarily on the text and structure of the Consti-
tution. Interpreters may also use contemporary accounts of original
intent, such as debates in the Constitutional Convention and the Fed-
eralist Papers." Longstanding and unchallenged legislative enactments
that commence soon after ratification can also demonstrate original
intent.51
Formalist thinking is prominent in many leading separation of
powers cases. For example, the Court strictly adhered to the text of the
Constitution in striking down the legislative veto in INS v Chadha2
The Court reasoned that allowing one chamber of Congress to over-
turn an executive branch decision failed to conform to the "[e]xplicit
and unambiguous" textual mandates of bicameralism and present-
ment.3 Clinton v City of New York rested on a similarly formalist ra-
tionale-that there was no textual basis for allowing the President in
effect to repeal statutes through a line item veto."
ing that separation of powers protections are embodied in the text itself).
47 Id. See also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U Pa L Rev
1513, 1523-24 (1991).
48 See, for example, id at 1526-27 & n 55 (describing interbranch competition through
strictly defined methods in matters of foreign affairs).
49 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 Harv J L & Pub Pol 21,21 (1998) (noting formalism's "deduction
from authoritative ... original intent").
50 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 38 (Princeton
1997) (stating that he consults The Federalist because it "display[s] how the text of the Constitu-
tion was originally understood").
51 See text accomoanying notes 164-69.
52 462 US 919, 945 (1983) ("Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution pre-
scribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative
process.").
53 Id at 945-51.
54 524 US 417 (1998).
55 Id at 438-40 (describing the line item veto as outside of the "'finely wrought' procedure"
designed by the framers), citing INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 951 (1983). Other formalist examples
include Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714 (1986), in which the Court invalidated the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act because it gave Congress removal power over an official performing ex-
ecutive duties, and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc, 501 US 252 (1991), which held unconstitutional an airport advisory body that
included members of Congress. Id at 277. See also Magill, 86 Va L Rev at 1138 n 37 (cited in note
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On the other hand, functionalism envisions extensive interaction
and overlap among the three branches of government. Instead of re-
jecting all assertions of power outside of those explicitly authorized by
the text, functionalism adopts a balancing approach that compares the
extent to which one branch's action prevents another branch from ex-
ercising its constitutionally assigned power with the policy justification
for that action.' Thus, if the policy justification trumps the degree of
encroachment on another branch, the action is constitutional." Func-
tionalists therefore consider not only the text, structure, and represen-
tations of original intent, but also policy arguments unrelated to for-
malist sources."
The Court has also used functionalism in recent decisions to al-
low overlap between the branches of government. Most prominently,
the Court used a functionalist balancing test in Morrison v Olson"8 to
uphold the constitutionality of the independent counsel. To deter-
mine whether the independent counsel was a principal or inferior offi-
cer, the Court weighed four different policy factors.' Likewise, Mis-
tretta v United States62 upheld the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion-a policymaking body-even though Congress placed it in the
judicial branch and required that three of its seven members be sitting
federal judges.
45) (classifying Clinton v City of New York, Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Bow-
sher, and Chadha as formalist opinions).
56 See Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425, 443 (1977) (using this bal-
ancing test to determine that a statute that directed an executive branch official to take custody
of a former president's papers did not violate the separation of powers).
57 Id (holding that when a statute might prevent one branch "from accomplishing its con-
stitutionally assigned functions," courts must determine "whether that impact is justified by an
overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress"). See also
Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,393 (1989) (balancing the "practical consequences" of plac-
ing a policymaking commission within the judicial branch against the threat of undermining the
integrity of the that branch or expanding its powers beyond constitutional bounds); Richard P.
Wulwick and Frank J. Macchiarola, Congressional Interference with the President's Power to Ap-
point, 24 Stetson L Rev 625, 642 (1995) (describing functionalism as "balanc[ing] the extent to
which one branch's actions disrupt the traditional delegation of power against the public policy
that might justify this disruption").
58 See, for example, Mistretta, 488 US at 396 (justifying the placement of a policymaking
commission in the judicial branch on the policy grounds of that branch's "special knowledge and
expertise").
59 487 US 654 (1988).
60 Id at 696-97 ("[T]he Act does not violate the separation-of-powers principle by imper-
missibly interfering with the functions of the Executive Branch.").
61 Id at 671-72. The four factors are whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher
officer, limited in duties, limited in jurisdiction, and limited in tenure.
62 488 US 361 (1989).
63 Id at 395-97,408 ("[W]e do not believe ... that the placement within the Judicial Branch
of an independent agency charged with the promulgation of sentencing guidelines can possibly
be construed as preventing the Judicial Branch 'from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions."'), citing Nixon, 433 US at 443.
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The Court continues to use both theories in separation of powers
cases, but formalism appears to be ascendant. This trend is exemplified
by the decision to eschew Morrison's balancing approach in favor of a
textual rule in Edmond v United States.4 Members of the Court had a
fairly clear choice between functionalist and formalist tests, and
picked formalism." Nevertheless, even if formalism is on the rise, the
Court has not explicitly chosen one theory over the other.6 Just eight
days after deciding Edmond, the Court approvingly cited Morrison,
Mistretta, and Nixon v Administrator of General Services in another
separation of powers case.6 Since justices on the Court continue to use
and advocate both theories, this Comment will analyze the CIT's po-
litical party restriction from both perspectives."
B. Statutory Restrictions on Appointments to Federal Office
Although the CIT's political party restriction is unique among
Article III courts and has never been challenged, many federal offices
have qualifications for membership. The Constitution itself limits the
range of people who may serve as President or as a member of the
Senate or House." The First Congress passed statutory qualifications
for some federal offices and successive Congresses have instituted
many more. Among its other achievements, the Judiciary Act of 1789
created the office of the Attorney General, and provided for District
Attorneys.7' Each of these government attorneys was to be "a meet
person learned in the law,"72 limiting the President in his nomination
64 520 US 651, 662-63 (1997) (holding judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Ap-
peals to be inferior officers because they have superiors).
65 See Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New Appoint-
ments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 Colum L Rev 1103, 1120 (1998) (arguing that in Edmond, Justice
Scalia's formalist majority opinion and Justice Souter's functionalist concurrence offered the jus-
tices a clear choice between the theories).
66 Some commentators believe the Court is more formalist when faced with legislative
aggrandizement and more functionalist when confronted with other potential separation of
powers problems. See Peter S. Guryan, Note, Reconsidering FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund
through a Bolstered Functionalism, 81 Cornell L Rev 1338, 1347-48 (1996) (positing such a
theory). Indeed, the Court was formalist when confronted with genuine legislative
aggrandizement in INS v Chadha and Clinton v City of New York. This distinction does not
explain Edmond, in which the Court took a formal approach in 1997 regarding the same issue
about which it used functionalism in 1988. If the distinction is correct, however, the Court should
be more likely to use formalism if it is faced with a statutory restriction.
67 433 US 425 (1977).
68 Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681, 701 & n 35 (1997) (observing that "[o]f course the lines be-
tween the powers of the three branches are not always neatly defined").
69 See Parts III and IV.
70 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 4 (setting qualifications for the presidency); US Const Art I, § 3,
cl 3 (setting qualifications for Senate membership); US Const Art I, § 2, cl 2 (setting qualifica-
tions for House membership).
71 1 Stat 73.
72 Id at 92-93.
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decision.73 The Judiciary Act also required that federal district court
judges reside in the district for which they were appointed.
The imposition of statutory qualifications and restrictions has
continued unabated."5 Being "learned in the law" was the first of many
qualifications and restrictions related to professional status and cre-
dentials. For example, Congress has required appointees to be mem-
bers of the bar of a federal court or a state's highest court," versed in
Spanish and English," engineers,"8 persons with demonstrated knowl-
edge in futures trading or commodities," and unconnected with a
credit union." Citizenship, residency, and geographic qualifications
have also been common.8' Some statutes have also required that the
President's nominees come from a particular branch or department of
the government or from civilian life.3 Congress has also required that
73 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 43
(Chicago 1997) (noting that the requirement "significantly sensibly restricted the President's dis-
cretion in selecting" the Attorney General and district attorneys); Susan Low Bloch, The Early
Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragma-
tism, 1989 Duke L J 561,567 n 24,571 n 32 (discussing competing interpretations of the Judiciary
Act of 1789's appointment provisions); Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of the
United States 490 (Macmillan 1971) (discussing aspects of those provisions). Later statutes ex-
tended this requirement to newly created United States Attorneys and several other federal offi-
cers who dealt with legal issues. See Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 267-69 n 43 (1926)
(Brandeis dissenting). The Attorney General and United States Attorneys are no longer re-
quired to be learned in the law. However, the qualification still applies to the Solicitor General.
See Act of Sept 6, 1966, Pub L No 89-554,80 Stat 378,612, codified at 28 USC § 505 (1994).
74 1 Stat 73.
75 For an exhaustive list of congressionally imposed qualifications and restrictions on
presidential appointees through 1926, see Myers, 272 US at 265-74 nn 35-56.
76 See, for example, 10 USC § 942(b)(3) (1994) (regulating appointments to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
77 See, for example, Act of Mar 3, 1851, 9 Stat 631 (governing appointments of agents to
California Land Commission). See also Myers, 272 US at 267-69 n 43 (listing positions with lan-
guage requirements).
78 See, for example, Act of Aug 24, 1912, Pub L No 62-334, 37 Stat 512, 517 (stipulating
qualifications for officers who may oversee the Alaskan Railroad Commission). See also Myers,
272 US at 267-69 n 43 (listing positions with engineering requirements).
79 See, for example, 7 USC § 4a(a)(1)(i) (1994) (mandating demonstrated knowledge be-
fore appointment to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission). Even members of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board were at one time required to be appointed with "due regard to a fair repre-
sentation of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical di-
visions of the country." Act of Jun 3, 1922, Pub L No 67-230,42 Stat 620.
80 See, for example, 12 USC § 1752a(b)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp 1999) (stating the require-
ments for the National Credit Union Administration Board).
81 See, for example, 28 USC § 44(c) (1994 & Supp 1998) (requiring that most federal circuit
court judges "be [ ] resident[s] of the circuit for which appointed at the time of [their] appoint-
ment and thereafter while in active service"); 28 USC § 134(b) (1994 & Supp 1998) (requiring
that most federal district court judges "reside in the district or one of the districts for which [they
are] appointed"); 47 USC § 154(b)(1) (1994) (stipulating that each member of the Federal
Communications Commission "shall be a citizen of the United States"). See also Myers, 272 US
at 265-67 nn 35-42,272-73 n 54.
82 See Myers, 272 US at 273-74 n 55 (listing positions requiring representatives from par-
ticular departments).
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the President choose a nominee from a list provided by others such as
Congress ' or industry and labor. M In addition, the President may not
appoint a relative to an agency over which he exercises jurisdiction.'
Political party restrictions also limit the President's choice of
nominees to numerous commissions, boards, and Article I courts.
These bipartisanship requirements emerged in the 1880s alongside the
creation of precursors to independent agencies. With the growth of
the administrative state, the President is constrained in nominating of-
ficials of agencies that govern a broad range of activities." As noted
above, however, the CIT is the only Article III court to have a political
party diversity requirement.89
C. Judicial Treatment of Restrictions
Considering the wide use of restrictions and qualifications of ap-
pointees, it is surprising how rarely courts have addressed the poten-
tial constitutional issues. Federal courts have issued few clear opinions
on the requirements for appointment, and none has thoroughly ana-
lyzed the question. More specifically, the CIT's political party restric-
tion has apparently never been raised in court.
1. Restrictions in general.
The Supreme Court's most direct analysis of the issue came in
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Public Citizen v United States De-
partment of Justice.M The case questioned whether the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act ("FACA") applied to the American Bar Associa-
83 See, for example, 10 USC § 942(b)(1) (1994) (requiring civilian appointments to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
84 See, for example, 31 USC § 703(a) (1994) (mandating that Comptroller General and
Deputy Comptroller General shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three in-
dividuals recommended by a commission of congressional leaders). See also Bowsher v Synar,
478 US 714,727-28 & n 6 (1986) (noting this method of appointment).
85 See, for example, Transportation Act of 1920, Pub L No 66-152,41 Stat 456,470 (requir-
ing that three members of the Railroad Labor Board be appointed from the employees' list of at
least six nominees, and that three be appointed from the carriers' list of at least six nominees).
86 5 USC § 3110(b) (1994) (antinepotism law).
87 See note 33.
88 One commentator noted at least thirteen administrative agencies with political party di-
versity requirements, although there certainly are more. Raskin, 52 Admin L Rev at 621-22 & n
51 (cited in note 3). See, for example, 47 USC § 154(b)(5) (Federal Communications Commis-
sion); 15 USC § 78(a) (1994) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 42 USC § 5841(b)(2)
(1994) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 10 USC § 942(b)(3) (1994) (United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces); 39 USC § 3601(a) (1994) (Postal Rate Commission); 5 USC §
1201 (1994) (Merit Systems Protection Board); 49 USC § 1111(b) (1994) (National Transporta-
tion Safety Board).
89 See text accompanying note 15.
90 491 US 440, 482-89 (1989) (Kennedy concurring) (discussing the appointment power
from a separation of powers perspective).
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tion's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which advised the
Justice Department on nominees to the federal bench." The majority
did not reach the constitutional questions raised by the participation
of an advisory committee in the appointment process,92 but Justice
Kennedy argued that applying FACA's open meetings and public re-
cords requirements to the ABA panel would unconstitutionally inter-
fere with the President's exclusive responsibility under the Appoint-
ments Clause by inhibiting his freedom to investigate and evaluate po-
tential nominees.9 Embracing a formalist viewpoint, Justice Kennedy
first argued that the text of the Appointments Clause explicitly com-
mitted the nomination power to the President, and that "[n]o role
whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in
the process of choosing the person who will be nominated for ap-
pointment."' He then turned to the Federalist Papers as evidence that
the framers intended Congress's only role in the appointment process
to be the Senate's power to give or withhold its advice and consent. 9
Therefore, he concluded, any statutory expansion of that power must
be unconstitutional.9
Despite this analysis, no court has ever invalidated a statutory re-
striction on appointments to federal office. Instead, a handful of
courts have followed a functionalist approach advocated in one Su-
preme Court case that did not directly deal with the issue. Chief Jus-
tice Taft's majority opinion in Myers v United States" found Congress
to have the authority to set qualifications for federal office under
some conditions. Using its legislative power, Congress may establish
offices, determine their functions and jurisdiction, fix their term and
compensation, and prescribe "reasonable and relevant qualifications
and rules of eligibility of appointees." This test should allow courts to
91 Id at 443-47 (majority opinion).
92 Id at 443 (deciding the case on the grounds that FACA did not to apply to the ABA
committee).
93 Id at 488-89 (Kennedy concurring).
94 Idat483.
95 Id, citing Federalist 66 (Hamilton) and Federalist 76 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The
Federalist Papers at 405,456-57 (cited in note 44).
96 Public Citizen, 491 US at 487-88 (Kennedy concurring).
9 The closest the Court has come was to invalidate a statute passed by the legislature of
the Philippines (then a U.S. possession) that allowed the legislature to appoint members of cer-
tain state-run corporations. Springer v Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189 (1928).
The Court held that the legislature violated the separation of powers inherent in its constitution-
like organic act by placing the appointment power in the legislature. Id at 201-03. However,
Springer does not address restrictions on nomination, only the rare situation in which a legisla-
ture attempts to grant itself the full power of appointment.
98 272 US 52 (1926).
99 Id at 129. Taft based this analysis of legislative power on a statement by James Madison
to the First Congress. Id at 128-29. However, Madison stated that the legislature only "creates
the office, defines the powers, limits its duration and annexes a compensation. This done, the
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balance policy goals represented by reasonable and relevant qualifica-
tions against the extent of encroachment on the President's power to
nominate.
A few other cases reflect Taft's functionalist view. Referring gen-
erally to Myers, Justice Stevens's concurrence in Bowsher v SynarU
stated that "it is entirely proper for Congress to specify the qualifica-
tions for an office that it has created.' ' .1 Taft's position also received
support in United States v Espy,"" which held that "[a]lthough there
are constitutional limits to the qualifications Congress can impose on
presidential appointees, we have little doubt that Congress could le-
gitimately restrict Agriculture Department officers to those not con-
victed under the Meat Inspection Act."'' 3 A district court cited Myers's
"reasonable and relevant" test in Mow Sun Wong v Hampton" for the
proposition that Congress has the power to prescribe reasonable
qualifications for at least inferior officers.1 5
A variant on Justice Kennedy's view was put forward in Justice
Brandeis's dissent in Myers. Brandeis agreed that the Constitution
permits some restrictions on appointments, but he employed a differ-
ent rationale. He noted that while "[t]here is not a word in the Consti-
tution" that authorizes Congress to limit the President's range of
nomination choices, Congress has enacted a "multitude of laws" that
restrict his power to nominate, and every President has observed these
laws.'"' "A persistent legislative practice which involves a delimitation
of the respective powers of Congress and the President, and which has
been so established and maintained, should be deemed tantamount to
judicial construction, in the absence of any decision by any court to
the contrary."'0 ' In short, long and extensive use and acceptance of
qualifications and restrictions gives them legitimacy.
Legislative power ceases." Id, quoting I Annals of Congress 582 (Gales and Seaton 1834). Taft
himself added the "reasonable and relevant" test. He may have based this idea on the extensive
list of qualifications and restrictions in Justice Brandeis's Myers dissent, or in a colloquy Taft held
with Solicitor General James Beck that Taft included in the opinion. Myers, 272 US at 96-97. Il-
lustrating a point, Beck stated that "when the condition imposed upon the creation of the office
has no reasonable relation to the office ... and is not the declaration of qualifications, but is the
creation of an appointing power other than the President, then Congress has crossed the dead
line." Id at 97.
100 478 US 714 (1986).
101 Id at 740 (Stevens concurring).
102 145 F3d 1369 (DC Cir 1998).
103 Id at 1372, citing Myers, 272 US at 128.
104 435 F Supp 37 (N D Cal 1977).
105 Id at 41 n 6. However, this case addressed a restriction-the exclusion of noncitizens
from civil service-mandated by an Executive Order through delegated power, not by a direct
act of Congress. Id at 40.
106 Myers, 272 US at 264-65 (Brandeis dissenting).
107 Id at 283, citing United States v Midwest Oil Co, 236 US 459,469 (1915).
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2. Restrictions on political party affiliation.
Finally, the only two cases that directly addressed a political party
restriction took a third approach and held the issue to be nonjusticia-
ble. In FEC v NRA Political Victory Fund,"'8 the Federal Election
Commission brought a civil enforcement action against the National
Rifle Association's political action committee, which then challenged
the constitutionality of the FEC on several separation of powers
grounds.'09 One of those claims was that the statute's requirement that
no more than three of six members of the FEC may be affiliated with
the same political party impermissibly limited the President's nomina-
tion power under the Appointments Clause. " The court acknowl-
edged that any such restrictions could raise constitutional questions,
but found that it was "impossible to determine in this case whether
the statute actually limited the President's appointment power.'"' The
court first noted that Presidents have often viewed restrictions as not
legally binding."2 Second, the court argued that the need for biparti-
sanship on the politically charged FEC imposed such political re-
straints on the President that he would not alter the commission's bal-
ance even if he were not constrained by the statute."' Invalidating the
restriction thus would not necessarily redress the NRA's claimed in-
jury."' The court did not specifically state that it was addressing the
NRA's standing, but by raising redressability questions the court im-
plicated standing doctrine. Standing appeared to be at issue when the
court concluded that the issue might only be justiciable if the Presi-
dent appointed and the Senate confirmed a fourth same-party mem-
ber, or if the President himself challenged the statute."' In a second
case, the Ninth Circuit followed NRA Political Victory Fund's conclu-
sion that the issue was nonjusticiable. " '
These holdings are open to significant criticisms. The argument
that political restraints prevent the President from making unbalanced
appointments is clearly undermined by the actual behavior when
108 6 F3d 821 (DC Cir 1993).
109 Id at 822. The court held that the presence of ex officio agents of the House and Senate
on the commission unconstitutionally exceeded Congress's legislative authority. Id at 826-27.
110 Id at 823-24, citing 2 USC § 437c(a)(1) (1988).
111 NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F3d at 824 ("Appellants do not argue, nor can we assume,
that the President wished to appoint more than three members of one party and was restrained
by FECA from doing so.").
112 Id.
113 Id at 825.
114 Id.
115 Idat 825 & n4.
116 National Committee of the Reform Party of the USA v Democratic National Committee,
168 F3d 360,364-65 (9th Cir 1999). The court held that the issue could not be redressed when the
Reform Party challenged the FEC's political party diversity requirement. Unlike NRA Political
Victory Fund, the court here explicitly stated that standing was at issue. Id at 365.
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there is no statutory political party restriction. In those situations,
Presidents rarely, if ever, make appointments on a strictly bipartisan
basis."7 To claim uncertainty about the effect of the statute on ap-
pointments to the commission is thus unrealistic."' In addition, these
courts are confused about standing doctrine regarding constitutional
challenges to administrative agencies."' Courts need not limit standing
to a President who wants to appoint a fourth member from a single
party to the FEC. A plaintiff only has to show that he has "sufficient
concrete interests at stake" to maintain standing to raise separation of
powers questions.'20 The D.C. Circuit interpreted this to mean that liti-
gants have such standing when they are "directly subject to the au-
thority of the [challenged] agency."'2' As the plaintiffs in both cases
were directly subject to the FEC's authority, the courts should have
granted standing."
Even if these two courts correctly held the FEC's political party
restriction nonjusticiable, the cases cannot be generalized. The D.C.
Circuit's argument about the need for bipartisanship on the politically
charged FEC does not extend to agencies that do not regulate parti-
san political activity. In particular, it does not extend to an Article III
court such as the CIT, which is insulated from political pressures.
Overall, the judicial record is too slim to draw any firm conclu-
sions about the CIT's political party restriction. Furthermore, the few
courts that have addressed restrictions generally have used different
interpretive theories. An analysis of restrictions and qualifications
117 One need look no further than federal judicial appointments to reach this conclusion.
See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Incentives, Reputation, and the Glorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U Cin L Rev 637,643-44 (2000) ("On average, approximately 90% of federal court
appointees are members of the same political party as the President who appoints them."). See
also Brief for Respondents NRA Institute for Legislative Action, NRA Political Victory Fund,
Grant Wills, FEC v NRA Political Victory Fund, No 93-1151, *49 (filed Sept 6,1994), available on
Lexis at 1993 US Briefs 1151 ("Respondent's Brief") ("[W]e are aware of no multimember
board or Commission to which a President has made appointments on a strictly bipartisan basis
in the absence of a statutory provision mandating such appointments.").
118 Respondent's Brief at *49.
119 See Raskin, 52 Admin L Rev at 614 (cited in note 3) (concluding that the D.C. Circuit's
attempt to avoid the issue "badly misunderstands" relevant standing doctrine).
120 See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1,117 (1976) (granting standing to litigants challenging the
method for appointing members of the FEC).
121 See Committee for Monetary Reform v Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 766 F2d 538, 543-44 (DC Cir 1985) (holding that private businesses and individuals do not
have standing to raise a constitutional challenge to the composition of the Federal Open Market
Committee because they were not subject to the direct authority of the Committee or the
Federal Reserve System).
122 Standing also would have been granted under a related Supreme Court standard. See
Ryder v United States, 515 US 177,182 (1995) ("[O]ne who makes a timely challenge to the con-
stitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case is entitled to a deci-
sion on the merits of the question.").
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therefore must begin with first principles of constitutional construc-
tion.
III. RESTRICTIONS UNDER FORMALISM
Under a narrow formalist reading of the Appointments Clause,
all statutory restrictions of any kind on the President's power to
nominate are unconstitutional. This view derives from a formalist in-
terpretation of the text and the structure of the Constitution, and ac-
cepted expressions of original intent. The Supreme Court's most ex-
tensive treatment of the question of restrictions reflects this perspec-
tive, and one could argue that a majority of the present Court is likely
to adopt it." However, much of the formalist evidence is open to al-
ternative interpretations, and a rigid application of the theory might
require overturning dozens if not hundreds of laws." Nevertheless, an
alternative but still formalist view of the evidence would not have
such devastating consequences.
A. Text and Structure
Formalists use the Constitution's text and structure as the starting
point for the argument that statutory restrictions on the President's
power to nominate federal officers are impermissible. Formalists as-
sert that the Appointments Clause is the only language in the text that
provides for the appointment of officers and therefore consult no
other provisions in deciding whether restrictions are valid.", Further-
more, the clear grammar and language of this exclusive allocation of
power does not permit any interference with the President's power to
select a nominee. The Constitution explicitly allocates the power to
nominate to the President alone and limits the Senate to advice and
consent on the appointment decision." Therefore, any attempt by
123 See text accompanying notes 90-96. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor
joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Public Citizen. Justice Scalia, a leading formalist on the
Court, did not participate in the case. Justice Thomas, also a formalist, was not on the Court at
the time.
124 See text accompanying notes 71-88.
125 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32
Wash & Lee L Rev 841,849 (1975) (noting that the President makes appointments under Article
II); John M. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal under the Federal Constitution: The Impact of
Buckley v. Valeo, 22 Wayne L Rev 1335, 1339-40 (1976) (stating that the Appointments Clause is
the only positive source for the appointment power); William P Barr, Common Legislative En-
croachments on Executive Branch Constitutional Authority, 13 Op OLC 248, 248-49 (July 27,
1989), reprinted in H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitution and the Attorneys General 523, 523
(Carolina Academic 1999) ("These methods of appointment are exclusive.").
126 See Public Citizen, 491 US at 483 (Kennedy concurring) ("By its terms, the Clause di-
vides the appointment power into two separate spheres: the President's power to 'nominate,' and
the Senate's power to give or withhold its 'Advice and Consent."'). See also Edmond v United
States, 520 US 651,659 (1997) (noting that the Appointments Clause vests the President with the
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Congress to limit the President's range of choices is unconstitutional.'27
All restrictions and qualifications are thus invalid, including the CIT's
political party diversity requirement. As noted above, this view of the
text and structure is reflected in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Public Citizen.8 The fact that this interpretation would invalidate per-
haps hundreds of organic statutes that include qualifications would
not deter a formalist from adhering to the text."
The key formalist assertions about constitutional text and struc-
ture can be challenged on several fronts. First, the text may not be as
exclusive as formalists claim. While the Appointments Clause grants
the President control over the nomination and appointment of offi-
cers, other provisions grant Congress power over the offices it creates.
This power may allow Congress to set qualifications for those offices.
The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to create
offices in order to execute the laws it passes.'30 A range of authorities
has argued that this power likewise permits Congress to fix restric-
tions for those offices."' Two recent Supreme Court opinions that
"exclusive" power to select principal officers); John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex L
Rev 633, 638 (1993) ("[T]he act of nomination is separated from the act of appointment by a
comma and a conjunction.").
127 The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel under President George H.W. Bush
also advocated this view. See Barr, Common Legislative Encroachments at 250 (cited in note 125)
(addressing statutes that require "a fixed number of members of certain commissions be from a
particular political party" and finding them to violate the Appointments Clause). Reflecting this
view, then-President Bush said in several signing statements that political party restrictions and
other qualifications in the laws being signed had no legal force. See, for example, National and
Community Service Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-610, 26 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1833 (Nov 19,
1990), reprinted in 1990 USCCAN 4539 (stating that restriction is "without legal force"); Cran-
ston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub L No 101-625, 26 Weekly Comp of Pres
Doc 1930 (Dec 30, 1990), reprinted in 1990 USCCAN 6231 (stating that the bill's restriction
"does not constrain the President's constitutional authority to appoint officers of the United
States"). Interestingly, the Barr memo was formally superseded in 1996, but the new opinion
does not mention the prior view. Walter Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers
between the President and Congress, 1996 OLC LEXIS 6 (May 7, 1996), reprinted in Powell, The
Constitution and the Attorneys General at 617 (cited in note 125).
128 491 US at 482-89 (Kennedy concurring).
129 See Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 918 (1997) (observing that the Court in Chadha
held unconstitutional "perhaps hundreds" of federal statutes).
130 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18. See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 138 (1976) ("Congress may un-
doubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Clause create 'offices' in the generic sense."); Freytag
v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 US 868,883 (1991) (same); Shurtleff v United States, 189
US 311, 313 (1903) (noting that Congress has the power to create the office of the Board of
General Appraisers). For a general discussion, see Note, Congressional Power under the Ap-
pointments Clause after Buckley v. Valeo, 75 Mich L Rev 627,639-44 (1977) (discussing congres-
sional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause in the appointments context).
131 See Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714, 740 (1986) (Stevens concurring) ("[l]t is entirely
proper for Congress to specify the qualifications for an office that it has created."); Ex Parte Gar-
land, 71 US 333, 378 (1866) (distinguishing private attorneys' mandatory oaths of office from
oaths taken by public officials, the latter of which "may be burdened with any conditions not
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acknowledge Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to create offices have simultaneously imposed Appointments
Clause restrictions on that power.' 32 Those constraints, however, were
imposed not in the context of qualifications, but regarding direct
appointment by Congress'3 and appointment vested in a court of law.
1'3
In short, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides a plausible though
not conclusive alternative source of congressional power to set restric-
tions.
More particular to Article III courts, including the CIT, both Ar-
ticle I and Article III give Congress the power to create federal courts
inferior to the Supreme Court.'35 This power is more specific than that
granted in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and could be construed
to grant Congress even wider authority to restrict access to the judicial
offices it creates.'36 Congress has the authority to "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court,'3 7 which relates to the inferior courts it
may "ordain and establish" from time to time. '38 First, these powers
could be analyzed similarly to the Necessary and Proper Clause lan-
guage. If so, however, the Appointments Clause limitations imposed
by the Supreme Court could also be carried over to this language."'
Second, a literal reading of the text could lead one to conclude that
prohibited by the Constitution"); Amos T. Akerman, Opinion to the President on Civil-Service
Commission, 13 Op Atty Gen 516, 520 (1871) (acknowledging that Congress has the power by
direct legislation to prescribe qualifications for offices created by law). See also Note, 75 Mich L
Rev at 641 (cited in note 130) (asserting that Congress should have the power under the Neces-
sary and Proper clause to place limitations on the appointing authority's freedom of choice of
nominees). Arguing that the ability to create an office gives Congress extensive power to stipu-
late qualifications, one commentator noted that it is "universally conceded that some choice,
however small, must be left the appointing authority." Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office
and Powers 1787-1957 74 (NYU 4th ed 1957). See also Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and
the Removal Power under the Constitution, 27 Colum L Rev 353, 391-92 (1927) (arguing that
Congress has long exercised its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to set qualifica-
tions for both inferior and principal officers).
132 See Buckley v Valeo,424 US 1,138-39 (1976) ("Congress' power under that Clause is in-
evitably bounded by the express language of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2."); Freytag, 501 US at 883 (same, cit-
ing Buckley).
133 Buckley, 424 US at 137-43 (evaluating the appointment of members of the Federal Elec-
tion Commission).
134 Freytag, 501 US at 883 (assessing the appointment of special trial judges by the Chief
Judge of the Tax Court).
135 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 9 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To constitute Tribunals in-
ferior to the supreme Court."); US Const Art III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in ... such inferior Courts as the Congress may ... ordain and establish.").
136 The assertion that Congress may have more power to set qualifications for federal
judges than for executive officers runs contrary to the policy of judicial independence estab-
lished by Article III. Nevertheless, a literal textual reading might compel this conclusion.
137 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 9.
138 US Const Art III, § 1. See Glidden Co v Zdanok, 370 US 530,543 (1962) (explaining that
the Article I language refers to Article III inferior courts).
139 See text accompanying notes 132-34.
The University of Chicago Law Review
the power to "ordain and establish" inferior courts broadly confers the
ability to set qualifications. Finally, Congress's significant discretion to
determine the jurisdiction of inferior courts might argue for a similar
power to dictate their composition."o Like the Necessary and Proper
Clause, these provisions offer another potential but equivocal textual
basis for qualifications and restrictions.
In addition, the language of the Appointments Clause itself could
be construed more broadly than formalists construe it. On its face, the
text is simply silent on whether limitations are permissible. This si-
lence could be filled by Taft's "reasonable and relevant" test from
Myers or by an inference from two centuries of statutory qualifica-
tions. The text of Article II does not explicitly stipulate that the Presi-
dent's range of choice must be infinite, so formalists are forced to turn
to evidence of original intent to demonstrate the clarity of the text.14
B. Original Intent
When the text and structure of the Constitution fail to settle a
separation of powers question, formalists often turn to the original in-
tent of the framers.'2 A variety of sources are commonly used as evi-
dence of their intent. None of these sources offers conclusive proof of
specific original intent regarding appointments restrictions, and some
are contradictory. However, one reflection of original intent-
contemporaneous legislative enactments that extend until the pre-
sent-is both a powerful challenge to the rigid formalist textual claim
that no restrictions are permitted and an avenue for supporting an al-
ternative formalist view that some restrictions are acceptable but the
CIT's political party restriction is not.
An examination of accepted original sources -the proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the debates
and actions of the First Congress -reveals significant concern about
where the appointment power should be lodged. Some invoke this
evidence in support of a constitutional bar on restrictions, but it is far
from definitive.
140 See Sheldon v Sill, 49 US 441, 449 (1850) (holding that Congress may restrict the juris-
diction of lower federal courts).
141 Public Citizen, 491 US at 483 (Kennedy concurring) (examining the Federalist Papers for
evidence of original intent).
142 See text accompanying note 50. Many formalists, however, see original intent as a far
le.ss reliable method of interpretation. See David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An
Exploration of Scalia's Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 Emory L J 1377, 1392-98
(1999) (discussing Justice Scalia's "faint-hearted originalism" that does not use extratextual
statements of the framers as authoritative sources of intent). See also Magill, 86 Va L Rev at
1138-39 & n 40 (cited in note 45) (discussing the absence of consensus among formalists about
using originalist sources).
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The background of the colonial period and the consequences of
the Articles of Confederation strongly influenced the framers' views
on the appointment power, particularly with respect to judges.143 Un-
der British law, the Crown held exclusive power to appoint judges and
other officers.'" This led to an extensive system of patronage, particu-
larly in the colonies, where the appointment of unqualified officers
"was a constant source of exasperation and anxiety in American soci-
ety.' '14 The British further fanned the flames by refusing to extend life
tenure and salary protection to judges.'46 Once the states achieved in-
dependence, they sharply limited executive involvement in judicial
appointments. 14 However, this led to abuse by state legislators. The pa-
tronage problem simply shifted to the legislatures, where the potential
for corruption and political intrigue was strong."8 Nevertheless, some
members of the Constitutional Convention preferred legislative to ex-
ecutive appointment.49 This conflict underscored the debate that fol-
lowed.
The full history of the appointments debate is well-documented
elsewhere, ° but two elements are relevant to this Comment. First, it is
clear that there was no consensus among the drafters about where the
appointment power should lie. Two of the three plans formally intro-
duced lodged the power in the legislature. "' Debate over the issue
143 For general discussions of this historical concern, see Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of
Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37 Syracuse L Rev 1037, 1044-57 (1987);
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 143-50 (Norton 1972); Ber-
nard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 105-08 (Belknap 1967).
144 See Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 145 (cited in note 143).
145 Id.
146 The Act of Settlement of 1701 extended these protections to judges in England. See
Blumoff, 37 Syracuse L Rev at 1048 (cited in note 143). Denying these protections to colonial
judges inflamed revolutionary passions. See Bailyn, Ideological Origins at 105-08 (cited in note
143).
147 "In six states, the executive authority had virtually no role in the judicial appointment
process." Blumoff, 37 Syracuse L Rev at 1055 (cited in note 143). Four states restrained their
governors' participation through legislative councils, two required approval by councils elected
by those qualified to vote, and New York established a separate Council of Appointment com-
prised of one member from each voting district and the governor. Id at 1056.
148 See Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 407 (cited in note 143) (noting that that
legislators were "guided by no rules of law but only by their crude notions of equity"); Max Far-
rand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 119 (Yale 1966) (statement of James
Wilson) ("Experience [showed] the impropriety of such [appointments] by numerous bodies. In-
trigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences.").
149 Id at 119 (statement of John Rutledge) (expressing fear of granting so much power in
one person).
150 See Blumoff, 37 Syracuse L Rev 1037 (cited in note 143).
151 See Farrand, ed, 1 Records at 21,244 (cited in note 148); Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787 599 (Yale 1966). The Randolph plan lodged appointment
power in the National Legislature, Farrand, ed, 1 Records at 21; the Pinckney plan gave it to Con-
gress, Max Farrand, ed, 3 The Records of the Federal Convention 1787 608 (Yale 1966); and the
Patterson plan placed it in the Executive. Id at 244. Hamilton's plan, which he never formally
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spanned three months, with deep differences of opinion. The Conven-
tion soundly defeated a proposal that the President alone appoint
judges,'z and the first vote on the proposal that the President nomi-
nate with the advice and consent of the Senate also did not garner a
majority."' The Convention also defeated Madison's proposal that ex-
ecutive nominations become appointments unless a majority of the
Senate disapproved." It appears that the sentiment during much of
the Convention leaned toward appointment by the Senate."5 Never-
theless, the Convention in the end accepted without objection and
with little debate the compromise that became the Appointments
Clause. 6 Without much evidence, it is risky to construct the rationale
behind this shift by the drafters. It is sufficient to acknowledge the
genuine divisions among them about the location of the appointment
power.
The second relevant element of the debates is the absence of spe-
cific intent regarding qualifications. One goal of the framers was to
give the power to the branch that would appoint the most qualified of-
ficers. Several believed the executive best for this task, " while others
favored the Senate's abilities."8 On the other hand, Madison in particu-
lar believed legislatures unlikely to make good appointments."9 Re-
gardless of the framers' conflicting views on which branch would pick
the most qualified candidate, they did not address the more specific
question of whether the legislature could regulate any qualifications."
Based on the framers' divergent views on the optimal locus of ap-
pointment power and the absence of specific intent regarding qualifi-
introduced, gave the power to the Executive, Farrand, ed, 1 Records at 244, with the Senate re-
taining the right to reject or approve nominees.
152 Farrand, ed, 2 Records at 44 (cited in note 151) (two states voted in favor, six voted
against, and one was absent).
153 Id (noting four states in favor, four against, and one again absent).
154 Id at 83 (noting three states in favor, six against).
155 Id. The Convention voted six to three on July 21, 1787, for this plan, which was formal-
ized in the Committee of Detail's report. Id at 183.
156 Id at 539 (approving the key language nem con (without objection)).
157 Farrand, 2 Records at 80 (cited in note 151) (Madison stating that the executive "would
in general be more capable & likely to select fit characters than the Legislature").
158 Id at 41 (Luther Martin stating that the Senate, "[being taken from all the States, it
[would] be best informed of characters & most capable of making a fit choice").
159 Farrand, 1 Records at 120, 232-33 (cited in note 148). Apparently observing the practice
in states with legislative appointments, Madison found lawmakers to be "incompetent Judges of
the requisite qualifications" and inclined to appoint judges "without any of the essential qualifi-
cations for an expositor of the laws." Id at 232-33. His solution based on this problem, however,
was to give the appointment power to the Senate, "a less numerous [and] more select body." Id at
233.
160 See John R. Vile and Mario Perez-Reilly, The U.S. Constitution and Judicial Qualifica-
tions: A Curious Omission, 74 Judicature 198 (Dec/Jan 1991) ("[A] review of the convention de-
bates and other contemporary sources reveals that almost no attention was paid to this issue.").
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cations, it is difficult to reach any conclusions from the debates of the
Constitutional Convention.
The Federalist Papers offer strongly worded language that has
been invoked to support a complete ban on restrictions and qualifica-
tions. 1 6 The most direct statement is Hamilton's argument that "[i]n
the act of nomination, [the President's] judgment alone would be ex-
ercised ... his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to
make the final appointment.' " If this reflects the genuine intent of the
framers, it is fairly persuasive. A President exercising only his own
judgment and being permitted to act as if he were making the ap-
pointment alone should not be constrained by legislative restrictions.
On the other hand, the foregoing account of the Constitutional Con-
vention leads to doubts about using Hamilton as an accurate barome-
ter of original intent. 16
The acts and debates of the First Congress, which are often used
to determine original understanding, also undermine the argument
that the framers intended to bar all congressional restrictions and
qualifications.'6' The First Congress established the first restrictions in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, establishing residency requirements for fed-
eral district court judges and requiring that the Attorney General and
District Attorneys be "a meet person learned in the law."'65 These pro-
visions limited the President's range of nominees, but there appears to
have been no suggestion that they violated Article II.'"While this leg-
islation is some evidence of original intent to permit qualifications for
office, it may not be decisive. It is quite possible that the provision es-
161 See Public Citizen, 491 US at 483 (Kennedy concurring), citing Federalist 66 (Hamilton)
and Federalist 76 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 405,456-57 (cited in note
44).
162 Federalist 76 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 456-57 (cited in note
44). Speaking of the Senate's power of advice and consent on nominations, Hamilton said there
will "be no exertion of choice" by the Senate and that "they cannot themselves choose" the
nominee. Federalist 66 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 405 (cited in note 44).
163 See text accompanying notes 143-160.
164 See, for example, Myers, 272 US at 111-32 (quoting extensively the debate over the
Judiciary Act of 1789); Bowsher, 478 US at 723 (citing the "Decision of 1789" as
"contemporaneous and weighty evidence" of the Constitution's meaning).
165 1 Stat at 92-93.
166 Currie, The Constitution in Congress at 43 (cited in note 73). When the First Congress
passed this qualification, there apparently was no suggestion that it violated the Appointments
Clause. Id. However, a member of the House objected the following year to a provision of a bill
that required the Superintendent of Indian Affairs to be a military officer, saying that the restric-
tion unconstitutionally infringed on the power of the President. Another member responded that
the President and the Senate were restricted in their appointments of officers in several depart-
ments, including the Attorney General. Nevertheless, the provision was removed from the bill, al-
though potentially for policy, not constitutional, reasons. Id at n 255; 2 Annals of Congress 1522-
23 (Gales and Seaton 1834).
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caped the notice of members debating the many monumental issues in
the bill or that its ramifications were not contemplated.
Nevertheless, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the other later statu-
tory restrictions offer an alternative formalist conception of restric-
tions. As noted above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down
the principle that "contemporaneous legislative exposition" in which
the framers actively participated "fixes the construction to be given its
provisions," especially when that interpretation has been "acquiesced
in for a long term of years."'67 This argument is essentially the position
Justice Brandeis took when he dissented in Myers.' The numerous
qualifications imposed by Congress from the outset and the absence
of significant objections therefore constitute weighty evidence in favor
of finding at least some restraints on the President's appointment
powers valid.'6'
C. An Alternative Formalist View
A more refined formalist analysis treats some statutory qualifica-
tions as having stronger degrees of tradition and acquiescence and
thus does not consider them equally valid under Article II. Formalism
might therefore approve of some statutory restrictions but invalidate
others. For the purposes of this Comment, the restrictions can be di-
vided into two categories of tradition and acceptance.
The first category encompasses restrictions that can be traced to
the framers and have been acquiesced in for many years. These in-
clude professional qualifications and residency requirements, which
the First Congress imposed and successive Congresses have pre-
scribed with little interruption or objection.7' Citizenship require-
ments also have a strong history, with the first one imposed in 1802."'
The second category includes restrictions without the imprimatur
of the framers and in which there has not been complete acquiescence.
Political party restrictions, which did not appear until the creation of
bodies that would later become independent agencies and have been
challenged in court, fall into this category.'7 2 The CIT's political party
167 Myers, 272 US at 175 (discussing statutes that allow removal of officers by the President
and listing precedents). See also Printz, 521 US 898, 905 (1997), quoting Myers, 272 US at 175;
Bowsher, 478 US at 723-24 (analyzing contemporaneous evidence to discern meaning).
168 See text accompanying notes 106-107.
169 An interpreter might also take into account the immense number of offices created by
Congress without appointment restrictions. Those created with qualifications could instead be
considered outliers from the constitutional norm.
170 See text accompanying notes 71-80.
171 Act of May 3, 1802,2 Stat 195,196 (providing that the mayor of the District of Columbia
must be a citizen of the United States and a resident of the District). See also note 81.
172 The antinepotism law and statutes that force the President to choose from a list pro-
vided by someone else are also in this category.
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restriction is an especially clear instance of a restriction in this cate-
gory. It was not established until 1956, when Congress declared the
CIT an Article III court, ' and the dispute in 1980 over whether to re-
tain the provision may indicate an absence of strong acquiescence.'74
Using this categorization, a formalist could validate the profes-
sional, residency, and citizenship requirements based on their long
tradition. A formalist could also find all restrictions in the second
category, including the CIT's political party restriction, in violation of
the text of the Appointments Clause.
The CIT's political party restriction is thus likely to be found un-
constitutional under formalism. The narrower version of formalism
that only considers text, structure, and indicia of original intent is in-
conclusive. However, an alternative formalist model that accepts acts
that the government has acquiesced to since the framing would clas-
sify the CIT's political party restriction as a violation of Article II's
separation of powers.
IV. RESTRICTIONS UNDER FUNCTIONALISM
Instead of examining only the text and structure of the Constitu-
tion and original intent of the framers, functionalism considers the ex-
tent to which statutory restrictions encroach on the President's power
to nominate and whether the policies underlying the restrictions jus-
tify this intrusion.'5 The Supreme Court's only balancing test for statu-
tory restrictions is Myers's language limiting them to "reasonable and
relevant qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees.'.. Courts
must evaluate these statutes on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether they are justified. Most restrictions will be found constitu-
tional under this test, but the CIT's political party restriction fails it
and thus violates the Appointments Clause.
The first step in the balancing test is to determine the extent of an
encroachment on the President's constitutionally assigned power to
nominate.'" Many statutory restrictions appear on their face to in-
fringe significantly on the executive power. For example, professional
qualifications-such as the requirement that members of the Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission have a demonstrated knowl-
edge in futures trading or commodities'- seem to limit severely the
President's range of choices. This limitation may be somewhat illusory
173 See text accompanying note 24.
174 See text accompanying notes 35-40.
175 See Nixon, 433 US at 443 (presenting the balancing test for separation of powers ques-
tions).
176 Myers, 272 US at 129.
177 See Nixon, 433 US at 443.
178 7 USC § 4a(a)(1)(i).
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because in practice the President is not likely to want to nominate un-
qualified officers. Still, it can be argued that many statutory restric-
tions encroach on the President's constitutional power. The CIT's po-
litical party restriction likewise severely limits the President's range of
choices. If the court already has five members from one political party,
the statute will exclude from consideration the large percentage of the
population from that party. Moreover, the President will almost al-
ways want to nominate a judge from his own political party, but the
configuration of the court may force him under the statutory restric-
tion to abandon those preferred choices.
Even if the infringement on executive power is significant, it
might still be justified by policy rationales of "reasonable and relevant
qualifications." For most statutory restrictions, the policy rationales
are reasonable and relevant. It is easy to understand why Congress
would want the Solicitor General to be learned in the law and CFTC
commissioners to be knowledgeable about commodities or futures
trading. Citizenship and residency qualifications are equally justifi-
able.
However, the CIT's political party restriction cannot be justified
as a reasonable and relevant qualification. The idea of an independent
judiciary is one of the most powerful and enduring values of the sepa-
ration of powers.'79 The framers sought to ensure an independent judi-
ciary by granting judges life tenure and preventing any diminution of
their salaries. '8 The difficult task of impeachment was the only method
permitted to remove federal judges."' The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly and vigorously defended judicial independence. For example, the
Court declared in 1982: "our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a
fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power of the United States'
must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the
independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides
clear institutional protections for that independence."""n
179 See, generally, Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes,
21 U Dayton L Rev 565 (1996) (describing America's long history of an independent judiciary).
180 US Const Art III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Com-
pensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
181 The Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal to allow removal by the executive
and legislative branches. See Farrand, 2 Records at 428-29 (cited in note 151).
182 Northern Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co, 458 US 50, 60 (1982). The
Court also outlined several justifications for an independent judiciary including: ensuring the in-
dependence of the judiciary from the control of the other branches, helping to promote public
confidence in judicial determinations, providing the security necessary to attract well-qualified
judges, and promoting individualism among judges. Id at 59 & n 10. See also United States v Will,
449 US 200,230 (1980) (holding repeals by Congress of previously approved salary increases a
violation of the Compensation Clause of Article III).
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Statutory qualifications for judges on Article III courts such as
the CIT impinge on their independence. Federal judges avoid identifi-
cation with a particular party after they have been confirmed, regard-
less of the party of the nominating President.' Forcing them to admit
their party affiliation therefore intrudes on their strict independence."
Forced association with a party may undermine public confidence in
their impartiality.' Formally designating judges as members of a par-
ticular political party may leave the impression that the judge is biased
toward members of his or her party. 6 Statutory qualifications also
could influence judicial decisionmaking if judges feel that their nomi-
nations depended on an explicit quid pro quo obligating them to rule
in favor of their party.
The policy arguments favoring political party qualifications for
Article III judges fail to outweigh the infringement on judicial inde-
pendence. During the debates over the Customs Courts Act of 1980,
supporters of the CIT's political party restriction offered two justifica-
tions. First, they argued that since the restriction forced the President
occasionally to "look outside his party for qualified candidates ... a
far larger and more diverse pool of talent would be drawn upon in
making nominations. '' "" This rationale does not justify the restriction.
The diversity of judicial talent should be accomplished by changes in
the party in control of the presidency.'* Moreover, there is no limiting
principle to this rationale. If forced presidential diversity can justify a
political party restriction on the CIT, it should justify a similar restric-
tion on all federal courts, including the Supreme Court. Such a statute
would intrude on judicial independence (or at least the public's per-
ception of it), and would significantly encroach on the President's
power to nominate.
183 Concerns about mixing judges and politics are evident in codes of judicial conduct. See
Canon 5:A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activity, ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct 25 (2000) (proscribing judges' political behavior).
184 In rare instances, judges may be unable to express their genuine political orientation if
doing so would unbalance the court in violation of the statute.
185 Consider Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum L Rev 235, 256
(1999) (arguing that the reputation of the federal judiciary will suffer if judges are forced to
adopt party labels).
186 Id. At the CIT, where cases usually involve a private party against the federal govern-
ment, formally affiliating judges with a political party may lead to the impression that the judge
is biased in favor of the government if the judge's party is in power, or against the government if
the judge's party is out of power.
187 See Customs Courts Act of 1980, HR Rep No 96-1235 at 134, reprinted in 1980 USC-
CAN 3729 (cited in note 25) (additional views of Representatives Robert McClory, Tom Rails-
back, Henry J. Hyde, and James Sensenbrenner, Jr.).
188 See Patricia M. Wald, Last Thoughts, 99 Colum L Rev 270, 271-72 (1999) (noting in re-
sponse to a proposal that appellate panels be required to be politically diverse that "the Consti-
tution provides its own device for diversity over the long haul through the nomination and con-
firmation of federal judges by the political branches").
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Second, the supporters argued that since the CIT makes interna-
tional economic policy, it should represent a cross section of the
"American body politic. 1 89 This is akin to the original justification for
political diversity on the Board of General Appraisers, which was to
maintain a balance between members with a high tariff philosophy
and those with a low tariff philosophy.'9'This argument lacks a limiting
principle and could thus be extended to the entire federal judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, which also rules on trade issues. In
addition, this rationale incorrectly assumes that party affiliation is an
accurate proxy for views on issues likely to be before the CIT. In fact,
both Democrats and Republicans have free trade and isolationist
wings, making the political party restriction a poor way for Congress
to achieve this diversity objective. Finally, this argument ignores the
duty of impartiality expected of federal judges,' which the framers
sought in part to guarantee through the Article III protections.'9
Judges should therefore make decisions based on the facts and law of
cases, not on some role as a representative of a segment of the Ameri-
can body politic.
While a political party restriction on an Article III court is not
justified under a functionalist approach, similar restrictions on admin-
istrative agencies and Article I courts present a more difficult ques-
tion. If members of administrative bodies such as the Federal Com-
munications Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion exercised only executive powers, political party restrictions would
be inappropriate. The vesting clause of Article II grants the President
the power to select appointees who will carry out his policies.'93 How-
ever, administrative agencies and Article I courts also exercise powers
similar to Congress and federal courts, which could justify the use of
political party restrictions.
Political party restrictions may be justified as a way to increase
the accountability of administrative agency officials.'9 Members of
189 Customs Courts Act of 1980, HR Rep No 96-1235 at 134 (cited in note 25) (additional
views of Representatives McClory, Railsback, Hyde, and Sensenbrenner).
190 Customs Courts Act of 1980, Hearings on HR 6394 at 194 (cited in note 37) (statement
of Andrew P. Vance).
191 Consider Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 Am U L Rev
699, 711-15 (1995) (discussing judges' obligation to impartiality).
192 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 465 (cited in note
44) (describing life tenure as "the best expedient which can be devised in any government to se-
cure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws").
193 See Myers, 272 US at 117 ("[T]he reasonable implication [of the constitutional mandate
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed] ... was that as part of his executive power [the
President] should select those who were to act for him under his discretion in the execution of
the laws.").
194 The independence of federal judges is in part safeguarded by shielding them from this
kind of accountability through Article III's protections.
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Congress are directly accountable to voters, who may defeat them at
the polls in a subsequent election. Agency administrators who prom-
ulgate binding regulations are not nearly as accountable. They might
therefore approve rules without regard to the public interest. More-
over, they may issue regulations with a bias toward the interests of the
President, due to his relatively unfettered power to remove them for
good cause. 9' Political party restrictions may therefore be "reasonable
and relevant" for administrative agency officials.
Political party restrictions also may limit the bias of administra-
tive bodies acting as court-like adjudicators. Agency adjudicators
might skew their decisions in favor of a President who has some re-
moval power. Political party restrictions would force the President to
appoint politically diverse administrative agency officers, and could be
justified as an attempt to make the agencies less likely to be biased."6
In short, political party restrictions can thus be justified as a way to
prevent the President from turning quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
bodies into partisan units that deny justice and benefits to members of
other parties.
CONCLUSION
The Court of International Trade's unique political party restric-
tion violates the Appointments Clause under either a formalist or
functionalist separation of powers theory. A narrow formalist view
that only considers the text and structure of the Constitution does not
sufficiently address the issues raised by statutory restrictions, as the
text and structure are neither clear nor exclusive. A formalist interpre-
tation would also lead to the invalidation of hundreds of restrictions
and qualifications of various offices. A broader formalist view that en-
compasses legislative enactments that reflect the intent of the framers
is more forceful. Certain restrictions reflect the original intent and are
valid, while those without the framers' imprimatur-including the po-
litical party diversity requirement of the CIT-are not. This strain of
formalism also does not lead to the invalidation of so many statutory
provisions.
195 See Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin L Rev 1111, 1144-46 (2000) (noting that
many commentators believe there to be a wide variety of reasons for which independent agency
officials may be removed "for cause").
196 On the other hand, agency adjudicators are likely to be the most shielded by "for cause"
restrictions, so political party restrictions may be less needed. See Dellinger, The Constitutional
Separation of Powers, 1996 OLC LEXIS 6 at *148-49 (cited in note 127) (arguing that "for cause
and fixed term limitations on the power to remove officers with adjudicatory duties affecting the
rights of private individuals will continue to meet with consistent judicial approval").
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The functionalist viewpoint also invalidates the CIT's restriction,
and may be marginally better at contending with restrictions and
qualifications in general. Functionalism's balancing test allows for a
case-by-case analysis of restrictions. Based on the very few challenges
raised to date, this task should not overwhelm courts. The bright line
rule sought by Justice Kennedy in Public Citizen is therefore not nec-
essary. A functionalist approach also would not instantly invalidate
any statutes, as would either type of formalism. However, functional-
ism would not be as proficient at settling the hardest cases-political
party restrictions on administrative agencies-and could lead to
mixed and confused holdings.
In the end, the CIT's political party restriction violates the Ap-
pointments Clause regardless of the theoretical perspective used. It is
an unjustifiable anachronism that should be eliminated.
